Abstract: We causally estimate the value of corporate ballot access. SEC Rule 14a-8 bounds investors’ right to put shareholder proposals on the ballot. We exploit the rotational assignment of SEC officials with different leniencies for instrumentation. Proposals at the margin of being allowed on the ballot reduce equity value by 1.19% at the SEC decision announcement. Losses concentrate in environmental and social proposals at 2.56%, while governance proposals show no statistically detectable effect. Expanding ballot access can impose financial costs, consistent with shareholders using their control rights to express social preferences. Download With: Florian Berg, Juan Palacios, Roberto Rigobon, and Siqi Zheng
I am on the 2026 fall job market. I am a postdoctoral fellow at MIT in Finance, working with Roberto Rigobon and Siqi Zheng. I study the impact of social preferences in corporate governance.